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Migration from password and token-based authentication in distributed systems 
requires fundamental changes to the authentication process.  A person’s biometric data is 
not a secret, which presents a fundamental difference with other authentication methods.  
Matching a sample with a database template is secondary to establishing trust in the 
integrity of the sample.  The process is similar to establishing a chain of custody for 
judicial evidence.  In computer systems this is accomplished using attestation 
architectures.  In this paper, a design for a secure remote biometric login system based on 
an attestation architecture is analyzed.  The system uses a commercially available Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) to authenticate the platform during the boot process and perform 
trusted private-key functions to participate in a challenge/response between the client and 
a remote biometric matcher.  The result is a system that can provide higher assurance 
than current systems in an economically and administratively feasible system. 
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Using biometric authentication as a primary means for system authentication is a 
viable alternative to using password authentication.  However, this technology is still in 
its relative infancy, and issues concerning secure implementation of biometrics remain.  
Aside from assessing and improving the performance of specific biometrics, most current 
and past research in biometric system security revolves around protection of the 
biometric template.  In this research, an attestation architecture is used in conjunction 
with biometric middleware to establish authenticity in the biometric capture process, 
resulting in a trusted path for secure biometric authentication. 
In most current authentication systems, the primary means for authentication is by 
password.  However, most passwords are simple enough that they can be easily guessed 
or broken through simple dictionary attacks [6].  Thus, the system is only as secure as the 
password used for authentication.  Simple passwords are easy to crack and compromise 
security.  However, complex passwords are difficult to remember and are expensive to 
maintain.  Adding to the problem, most users use the same password for different 
authentications/applications and therefore, if a password is compromised, it gives an 
attacker the full privileges assigned to the user. 
Password limitations can be improved by incorporating other methods of user 
authentication.  One such method is biometric authentication.  Biometric authentication 
refers to verifying individuals based on their physiological or behavioral characteristics.  
This can include such things as fingerprints, hand geometry, retina, and voice.  Biometric 
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authentication is potentially more reliable than password-based authentication, since 
biometric characteristics cannot be lost or stolen, they are difficult to copy, and they 
require presence at the point of authentication.  Consequently, biometric authentication 
has the potential to become the primary authentication method in computing systems, but 
technical advances are needed in the three areas listed below to improve security. 
• Performance – reliable, unique measurement of biometric for widest set of users 
• Liveness testing – detection of physical spoofing 
• Sample authenticity – establishment of sample collection process 
Performance and liveness testing involve modality-specific improvements, and 
these metrics are important to assess before considering the use a particular biometric.  
This paper focuses on the third issue: sample authenticity, which current remote 
authentication systems give little attention to. 
Matsumoto and others successfully used fake fingerprints to achieve a biometric 
match [5].  Improved liveness testing can prevent physical attacks like these that do not 
compromise the system, but signal injection attacks will continue to be possible because 
sensors do not bind the sample to the identity of the sensor or the time that the sample 
was taken.  For instance, retina scanning, which would be very difficult to spoof through 
physical means, can still be recorded and replayed at the sensor level.  The use of 
templates protects privacy and prevents reuse of biometric samples between systems [4, 
16], but there is little to prevent a dishonest party from capturing a biometric in raw form 
to be used as a live sample in another system.  As biometric identification becomes 
widespread, people will become accustomed to frequently providing biometric samples, 
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and the possibility of a Trojan sample acquisition or a dishonest administrator is realistic.  
The result is similar to using the same password for multiple systems.  When personal 
biometrics are no longer a secret, then how can an automated system be sure that a 
biometric sample is coming from a biometric device and not recorded data?  
Consequently, biometric samples must be treated more like evidence and less like a 
password.   
 
Figure 1:  Attack Tree For Generic System. 
Consider the attack tree in Figure 1, which represents a standard remote biometric 
login without trusted hardware.  The system can be attacked through software or 
hardware (locally), and there is little to prevent an attacker from inserting a biometric 
sample from anywhere in the network, perhaps from an untraceable location.  The 
addition of a local private key provides minimal additional protection, because an 
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attacker can use a virus or Trojan horse to retrieve keystores, capture biometric samples, 
and keystrokes from an authorized user’s workstation.   
From the example in Figure 1, it is clear that adding a biometric to an insecure 
system provides little benefit, and there is no distinction between a valid platform and an 
attacker’s platform that can provide the same credentials.  The opportunity for an attacker 
to insert or capture a live sample starts with the end sensor and continues up the chain 
until a trusted entity can sign or encrypt the sample.  Ideally this would occur in the 
sensor itself, but this would require key management at the device level.  Providing 
tamper resistance, enrollment and revocation at the device level would be ideal, but it is 
not considered in this paper due to the large administrative burden.   
Instead, it is more reasonable to establish a chain of integrity within the platform 
and sign the sample by the local root of trust.  The level of trust in the signature depends 
on the ability to protect the key and the ability to authenticate requests to use the key.  If 
the key is protected by tamper resistant hardware, and if the authenticity of the software 
is verified prior to signing, then this establishes a trusted relationship between the 
platform and the live sample.  This can be accomplished using a commercially available 
attestation architecture, where components vouch for the validity of information by 
signing with a private key.   
In this research, the Trusted Computing Group’s (TCG) Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM) [14] is used in the design of a secure remote biometric login system.  The process 
involves a chain of several components, and each verifies the next component.  The 
system remains independent of specific biometric technologies using the BioAPI 
specification [2].  A remote matching service is used to reduce the physical exposure of 
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the final decision point, and the remote match is performed as a system independent step 
that can provide authentication credentials for multiple systems. 
 In the following chapter, the background on which this research was built upon is 
presented.  First, the related work will be covered.  It can be noted that most work related 
to biometric security revolves around template security, as mentioned earlier.  During this 
section, reasons why template protection alone is not enough for biometric security will 
be presented.  Following this, an overview of bioAPI as well as an overview of our 
attestation device will be given.  In relation to bioAPI, reasons why it is not secure in its 
current form will be presented. 
 In the final chapter, the research methodology will be presented.  First, an 
overview of the actual hardware and software used will be given.  Second, an overview 
of the code used in this research is given.  Next, the results are provided, which show 
how the work provides added security to a biometric system.  Finally, conclusions are 




Given the assumption that raw biometric data cannot be considered a secret as 
discussed in the previous section, approaches that create secret keys or unlock secret keys 
using biometric data are incomplete without integrity verification.  This is still true if the 
algorithms used to achieve these ends remain a secret, since raw data can be injected to 
replace sensor data.  Creation of keys from biometric data removes the need to trust the 
matching algorithm, but this is not useful if the biometric sample is not a secret or is not 
combined with other secrets.   
Using a local biometric match to unlock a key, which is used as the network login 
credential, can be even less secure than using a password.  A biometric match is typically 
a Boolean value (after thresholding), providing no protection beyond code obfuscation, 
which is difficult to quantify.  Password attacks at least have a measure of protection 
through repeated hashing to slow down a brute force attack.  Even if sufficient protection 
is provided to enforce that a valid live sample is used to unlock the key, what mechanism 
prevents an attacker from using an electronic copy of a valid live sample to the matching 
algorithm?   
2.1 Related Work 
Most work related to the protection of biometric data centers around template 
protection.  This is quite important as biometric data spends most of its time in template 
form.  However, if the biometric is not a secret, how important and how protected is the 
template if the raw data itself can in no way be legitimized? 
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Sun et al. [10] proposed a template called KMT, or Key-Mixed Template.  The 
idea is to use the template in conjunction with a secret key to create a new template.  This 
mixture between the secret key and the original template is done on the user end and is 
matched on the server side with the database.  By having a separate secret key per 
authentication system, having a template compromised does not necessarily mean the 
attacker can gain access to all systems that use that biometric template.  This new 
template can help to prevent backend attacks, snooping, and tamper attacks without a 
performance hit. 
Sutcu et. al. [12] proposed a method for protecting minutiae-based fingerprint 
templates using a geometric transformation.  The solution creates a two-dimensional 
vector from a set of minutiae points.  A centroid point is calculated from this minutiae set 
and a circle is drawn around it.  For every pair of minutiae points in the set that are 
greater than a pre-defined threshold, a line is drawn through them and the two points of 
intersection of the line and circle are determined.  The intersection points are then 
organized into bins according to their position in the circle and the number of points in 
each bin are concatenated together to create the fingerprint code.  This sounds fine in 
theory, but no rigorous security testing has been done as of yet, so the robustness of the 
code is not known.  Furthermore, like other work which only deals with template 
protection, this work would not be able to protect against a raw biometric data 
compromise. 
Sutcu et. al. [11] also proposed a system to protect biometric templates by using 
secure sketch, an error-tolerant cryptographic primitive.  They use feature vector 
extraction on biometric samples, apply user-specific random mapping on these vectors, 
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and then secure them using the sketch.  However, they note that the security measure in 
terms of entropy loss may not be sufficient since false accept rate and false reject rate 
should also be considered in practical systems. 
Uludag et. al. [16] proposed to generate a cryptographic key using biometric 
information.  Their solution proposed to hide a cryptographic key in the user’s biometric 
template itself.  It relies heavily on the robustness of the key hiding and retrieval 
algorithms, which could be placed within the biometric reader device, requiring 
controlled biometric devices.  However, this does not really help to add security if the 
biometric itself is not a secret. 
Jain et. al. [4] constructed a list of possible biometric attacks which would leave 
biometrics vulnerable.  From this list, they determined that it is of high importance to 
make sure the template is secure and cannot be compromised.  Possible techniques to 
increase security within templates include watermarking and steganography.  Also, by 
using smartcards to store biometric templates, the chance of an attacker stealing the 
template is reduced considerably. 
While all these systems help to protect the template, this still does not protect or 
authenticate the raw biometric capture data (before it is put into a template), and it also 
does not provide a trusted path from the capture device to the biometric server.  While the 
biometric data does exist mostly in template form, and template protection is important, 
the raw data cannot be ignored.  If an attacker were to steal the raw biometric data from 
one system and use it with a modified device in another to gain access, how could this be 
prevented?  A protected template means nothing if it protects raw data that is easily 
stolen from another system and injected in the present one.  For a system to fully trust 
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that a user is who he or she says, the full path from the device to the authenticator needs 
to be trusted. 
Using a TPM to enhance the security of a biometric login is not a new idea, and 
there are multiple commercial solutions and research concepts using this widely available 
security tool [1, 3].  However, current systems only provide a wrapper around legacy 
password based systems (a successful biometric match unlocks a password cache).  This 
places full trust in an end device that could be subjected to a rigorous offline attack.  
Current systems also do not provide sufficient authentication of the software on the 
platform used to collect the biometric sample.  For instance, current systems do not detect 
if the device driver has been altered to send a pre-captured sample rather than read from 
the device. 
Ratha et. al. proposed a challenge/response system to alleviate the problem with 
resubmission attacks on biometric devices [7].  In their proposed method, the server 
would generate a random challenge and the sensor would compute a response to the 
challenge.  Their research involves custom sensor devices, which use sensors that are 
able to integrate logic to participate in a challenge/response system.  The research in this 
paper assumes no changes are made to the biometric sensor device. 
Chen and others proposed an attestation based system to provide for the integrity 
of the biometric sample [3].  Their work required a custom, trusted biometric reader 
device and a modified TPM capable of performing a biometric match, which may not be 
practical.  The research in this paper assumes that an unaltered TPM and a standard 
biometric reader will be used, albeit at the cost of less assurance in the capture process.  
Additionally, rather than performing a local match and releasing a key that provides for a 
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login credential, this paper uses a local key to attest that a live sample was collected from 
what appeared to be a valid device and then the signed sample is sent to a biometric 
matching server.  A remote matching server provides additional security measures: it 
removes the capacity for offline attacks of the matching process, it provides increased 
integrity, and it provides better auditing and management of the authentication process. 
2.2 Attestation Overview
This system uses an attestation device to derive a trusted platform, which extends 
work by Safford [8] to include verification of the network client, BioAPI, and the 
biometric device driver.  The research system uses the TCG Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM) Specification version 1.1b [14].  However, a newer version of this specification is 
currently available [15], which may be used in future development as resources permit. 
The TPM chip provides several security features to help make a system more secure [8].   
The first is a boot-time authentication system.  The TPM has the ability to 
measure the system as it is booted and as software is loaded.  This creates a profile of the 
system’s operating software.  This profile is based on a hash computed by the TPM from 
code as it is loaded.  The TPM has sixteen Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) that 
can be used to store the hashes of the software boot chain.  This checks the integrity of 
the BIOS, the MBR, trusted GRUB, Linux kernel, the initial Ramdisk image, the net 
client, BioAPI, and the biometric device driver.  An example of this can be seen in Figure 
2.  In this system, each layer authenticates the next layer.  This ensures integrity as the 
next layer is not loaded unless the previous layer has been approved.  By doing this, we 
can provide evidence that all pertinent software components on the machine are 
unaltered. 
12
Figure 2:  Block Diagram For Boot Sequence. 
 
The contents of the TPM’s Platform Configuration Registers can be compared to 
reference values at any time.  This means that not only will all pertinent software be 
checked during the boot sequence, but if the software is reloaded at any time while the 
computer is on, the PCR will recheck the value with the reference value.  If the values 
differ, an appropriate action (determined by the user) can be taken.  Examples could be 
automatically denying access or prompting the user for a decision.  The advantage to this 
is in situations when the intruder attempts to bypass the boot check by injecting a 
virus/worm after the computer has already booted.   
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The TPM can also provide additional security by signing the hash value stored in 
the PCR.  The signed value serves as proof of the state of the remote machine.  For a 
server to only read the hash value of a remote machine does not provide assurance that 
the machine should in fact have access to the network.  This is because stored, unsigned 
hash values can be stolen from one machine and used in another for an attack.  Another 
possibility is an attacker changing the values during transmission.  By signing the values 
using a trusted key inside the TPM, the remote party can be assured that the hash is legit. 
The TPM also provides hardware based public key management and 
authentication.  The private keys for these services cannot be stolen by software attacks 
as they are generated and kept on-chip.  Finally, it provides secure storage of data.  This 
can include keys, which the TPM maintains over reboots. 
2.3 BioAPI overview 
The purpose of BioAPI [2] was to provide an API that could serve the various biometric 
languages.  The BioAPI Consortium was formed in April of 1998, with a multi-level API 
architecture developed later in that year.  In December of 1998, I/O Software joined and 
the BAPI specification was integrated as the lower level of the BioAPI specification.  In 
March 2000, Version 1.0 of the BioAPI Specification was released. 
 BioAPI was originally developed to be a multi-level API.  The “high level” would 
include basic calls such as enroll, verify, and identify.  The lower level would address 
increasing control, detail, sophistication, and technology dependence.  However, it was 
decided that the lower level proposals were not broad enough to justify inclusion into the 




 The API consists of three high-level abstraction functions:  Enroll, Verify, and 
Identify.  During Enroll, samples are captured from the biometric device, processed into a 
template, and then sent to the application.  The Verify function captures one or more 
samples from the device, processes them into a template, and then matches the template 
against an input template.  The results of this comparison are returned to the application.  
The Identify function is similar to the Verify in that a comparison takes place.  However, 
instead of matching the captured sample template against a single input template that the 
user claims to be, the captured sample template is matched against a set of templates and 
a list is returned showing how close the sample compares against the top candidates in 
the set. 
 The processing of biometric data from raw samples to template to matching 
against a template can be accomplished in many stages.  However, this usually involves 
much CPU-intensive processing.  The API has been defined to allow the developer as 
much freedom as needed in the placement of processing involved.  It also allows the 
processing to be shared between the original client machine and possibly a server 
machine.  Furthermore, it allows for devices that can do all the processing internally. 
 There are other reasons as to why processing and matching are a good idea to do 
on a server.  First, the algorithms will execute in a more secure and trusted environment.  
Second, the client PC may not have enough horsepower to run the algorithms as well, or 
not have the ability to support a large local database, both of which can be provided by a 
server.  Third, the user database and resources may already be on the server, so this 
makes it more convenient.  Finally, identification over large populations can only 
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reasonably be done on a server.  However, the developer needs to be very careful.  
Transmitting raw biometric data over a network between a client and a server could leave 
the data vulnerable to being captured by an attacker.  This problem can be alleviated by 
creating the template on the client system, but again, this is up to the administrator as the 
client system might not be very powerful and take time to create the template. 
 There are two methods provided by the API which support client/server 
processing.  The first is the use of primitive functions. There are four primitive functions 
in the API which can accomplish the same result as high-level abstractions.  They are 
Capture, Process, Match, and CreateTemplate.   
 Capture is the process of capturing biometric data.  This is always performed on 
the client machine.  Doing so on a server (which would not have a biometric device 
attached) would return an error.  The samples are acquired, done for the three basic 
functions mentioned earlier (Enroll, Verify, or Identify), and processing on the samples 
are then done.  The Capture function is capable of performing all the processing on a 
sample and it is up to the developer as to how much is actually done on the client.   
 The Process function is used to process samples necessary for verification and 
identification, but not enrollment.  These algorithms must be available on the server; 
however, they can also be available on the client.  On the server, processing will always 
be completed.  On the client however, the application can defer processing to the server.  
Also, in an effort to save bandwidth or server horsepower, the client can opt to finish the 
processing itself. 
 The Match function performs the actual comparison between the templates.  It can 
be done between two templates (VerifyMatch) or a set of templates in a database 
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(IdentifyMatch).  The match functions are always available on the server, and much like 
the process function, they may also be available on the client. 
 The last function included in the primitive functions is the CreateTemplate 
function.  It is provided to perform the processing of samples to form a template.  
Optionally, the function can also take an existing template and create a new template 
from it, using new samples acquired.  Another option is the ability to allow the 
application to provide a “payload” to wrap inside the new template.  An example of a 
primitive function implementation is shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3:  Client/Server Implementation Using Primitive Functions (Taken From 
The BioAPI Specification, Version 1.1 [2]). 
 
The second method provided by the API to allow client/server processing support 
is called streaming callback. In this method, the application is responsible for providing 
a streaming interface to transfer the samples and return the results.  Also, the application 
does not need to use the primitive functions described earlier.  The Verify, Identify, and 
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Enroll functions use the streaming interface to split the functions between client and 
server.  If there are GUI callbacks set, the client will call them when needed to allow the 
application to control the look and feel of the UI. 
 Streaming Callback leaves the decision making to the application.  The 
client/server application decides whether authentication is driven by the client or the 
server.  First, the driving component sets a Streaming Callback interface for the biometric 
service provider (BSP).  Not only does this tell the BSP that it will operate in 
client/server mode, but also provides an interface for communication.  The application 
then calls the appropriate high-level function, and the BSP calls the Streaming Callback 
to initiate the BSP-to-BSP protocol. 
 The Streaming Callback is only used by the driving BSP.  Whenever it is in 
control and has a message to deliver to its partner, it calls the interface to send the 
message, and receives an answer on return.  A StreamInputOutput function is used by the 
non-driving application in order to deliver messages to the driving BSP.  The driving 
application sends a return message by returning from the Streaming Callback.  Figure 4 
and Figure 5 show examples of a streaming callback implementation. 
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Figure 4:  Client/Server Implementation Using Streaming Callback - Server 
Initiated Operation (Taken From The BioAPI Specification, Version 1.1 [2]). 
 
Figure 5:  Client/Server Implementation Using Streaming Callbacks - Client 




As discussed earlier, there are some possible security risks associated with having 
an open system using biometrics and BioAPI.  The most common types of attacks might 
be in the form of signal injection, a Trojan horse, or software alteration.  All of these 
attacks might give an intruder the ability to spoof an allowed user to gain access into the 
system. 
 The first possible attack covered is a signal injection.  Suppose an attacker was 
able to acquire a user’s biometric data from some other system.  The way it was acquired 
is not really known but that is not important.  The attacker has the raw data of an allowed 
user and can therefore possibly inject this data into the system.  As long as the data is 
injected before the step where the raw data is converted into a template, the system will 
have no idea that the sample was injected and not captured from the biometric device.  If 
this attack were to occur, the attacker would gain access and the system would be none 
the wiser. 
 A second common attack would be a Trojan horse.  This type of attack could be 
used in conjunction with the previous attack.  For instance, the malicious script would 
extract the raw sample from the sequence chain (before it was converted to a template).  
This might happen on another system which is not as secure and therefore the attacker 
has access too.  Or, it could be on the same system where the attacker has limited rights 
and is trying to gain access as a user with more rights on the system.  An attacker can use 
a virus or Trojan horse to retrieve keystores, capture biometric samples, and keystrokes 
from an authorized user’s workstation. 
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The third common attack discussed is software alteration.  With an open system 
that has modifiable software and drivers, it is important that the software is not altered 
maliciously to allow attackers access.  In the case of biometrics, some software might be 
altered to increase the false acceptance rate (FAR).  Furthermore, BioAPI might be 
altered to pull templates or samples from locations other than the biometric sensor.  It is 
important, therefore, to make sure that after the BioAPI software is installed, as well as 
the other pertinent biometric software, it is not being changed or altered.  The system 




The research system uses platform authentication and remote matching to create a 
medium-grade authentication using a single-factor biometric authentication (which would 
be backed up by a password and token for users that are unable to reliably use the 
system).  The hardware of the user workstation consists of a biometric device (any device 
with a Linux BioAPI device driver) and a complete commodity workstation equipped 
with an embedded TCG compliant TPM.  The major software components of the user 
workstation consist of a trusted boot loader, operating system, network client, BioAPI, 
and a biometric device driver.  By using a TPM in a bootstrap process [7], there is a 
measure of assurance that the platform has not been altered and that the proper driver is 
used to collect the sample.  
Figure 6:  Client/Server Overview. 
22
A Biometric Authentication Server (BAS), shown in Figure 6, is used to evaluate 
the validity of a biometric sample using evidence provided by the user workstation as 
well as match the sample with a known template.  Notice how the BAS is completely a 
completely separate entity from the login/remote service.  To enable validation, a root of 
trust acknowledged by the BAS must enroll each user workstation.  Given a successful 
validation and match, the BAS returns the requested login credentials – ideally in the 
form of signed challenges.  The BAS is similar to the user workstation with the exception 
of the additional BAS service software and a reduced set of user applications.  Like the 
user workstation, the BAS is designed to use BioAPI to be independent of biometric 
technologies.  Additionally, the BAS enables independence from network services 
enabling a one-time login and removal of the requirement for network services to be 
biometric-aware.  A remote biometric match also enables the following security features. 
 
• User revocation 
• Workstation revocation 
• Multiple attempt lockout 
• Convenient algorithm updates 
• Reliable auditing 
• Intrusion prevention possibilities 
 
These features prevent an attacker with physical access to an approved platform from 
physically spoofing a valid biometric. 
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Our research platform is described in more detail as follows.  The user 
workstation is an IBM ThinkPad z60t, outfitted with a TCG TPM (Version 1.1b) [9] and 
a built in UPEK fingerprint reader device.  The operating system is the Red Hat Fedora 
Core 5 with Linux kernel version 2.6.15.  The Linux fingerprint driver provided by 
UPEK is invoked through BioAPI [2] to collect the fingerprint sample from the reader.  
Trousers, the open-source TCG Software Stack, is used to interact with the TPM [8].  
Currently, a small program that requests a biometric sample through BioAPI is used to 
emulate the network client. 
A seal program needs to be used on the platform to seal all the data important to 
keeping the integrity of the system.  When the system is in a known good state, the 
administrator will run a seal on all the data to be unsealed when the user attempts to log 
on at a later time.   
An example of the seal being run is shown in Figure 7.  From the command line, 
the seal executable is run with three parameters.  The first parameter is the TPM version, 
the second parameter is the PCR register to hold the system state for when the unseal is 
called.  The last parameter is the file to be sealed.  This command needs to be run for 
every file required to establish system integrity.  In the figure below, the file being sealed 
is the biometric device driver. 
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Figure 7:  Example Seal. 
 
The protocol for the login sequence is shown in Figure 8.  All communications 
between the local client and the remote service use 2-way authenticated SSL.  Both the 
local machine and the remote service will contain private keys protected in hardware.  
When the local machine sends a login request to the remote service, the remote service 
will return an authentication challenge.  The local client will then forward the challenge 
to the BioAPI, which will request a live sample from the biometric device.  However, 
before the live sample is requested, the TPM will check the biometric driver during the 
BioAPI Init call.  If the biometric driver has been compromised, the TPM will not allow 
BioAPI to finish initializing and the authentication will halt.  If the biometric driver is 
unaltered, the TPM will allow the authentication to continue and the live sample to be 
requested.  This and subsequent steps involving BioAPI interacting with the BAS and the 
TPM represent new functionality that is proposed as an enhancement to the current 
BioAPI or a new layer on top of the current BioAPI.  Before taking the sample, and while 
BioAPI is initializing, the TPM will check the platform to make sure it has not been 
compromised.  If the machine is in an approved state, the TPM will allow the 
authentication to continue.  The TPM will then allow BioAPI to take the live sample, 
which it will forward to the BAS.  The BAS will then check for a match.  If a match is 
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found the BAS will send a response for the authentication challenge back to the local 
client.  The local client will send this response to the remote service, where it will be 
verified.  A result is then sent back to the local client, either allowing or refusing a login. 
Figure 8:  Sequence Diagram For Authentication Protocol. 
Below are example pseudo equations for the TPM functions used in this research.  
The name of the driver as well as the PCR used for this specific research are included in 
the equations for clarity. 
• Seal Operation 
• SealedDataBlob=Kroot(SHA1(libtfmessbsp.so),PCR8) 
• Unseal Operation 
• UnsealData=Kroot(SealedDataBlob,PCR8) 
• UnsealData?=SHA1(libtfmessbsp.so) 
• Verify Operation 
• CurrentConfig?=PCR8 
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The equations are explained as follows.  For the seal function, the TPM root key 
(denoted by Kroot) is used to seal a SHA-1 hash of the driver, as well as store the current 
configuration at the time of seal in PCR-8.  This sealed blob is then stored to a file.  
When the unseal is performed, the TPM will again use the root key to unseal this blob.  
At the time of unseal, the current value in PCR-8 will be checked against the value at the 
time of seal.  If they do not match the unseal will fail.  After the data is unsealed, the 
unsealed data will be checked against a SHA-1 hash of the current driver.  If they differ 
by even one bit, the operation fails.  Finally, during the verify phase of the login 
sequence, the current client configuration is compared against the reference value to 
make sure that no tampering has occurred while the biometric sample was being 
acquired. 
3.1 Code Overview 
The code written consists of two main files, the seal function and the unseal 
function.  The seal function receives a PCR number to use as well as the file to be sealed.  
Within the program, all the TPM handles are called and the file is sealed.  However, 
before the seal function is called, a SHA-1 hash of the file is taken.  This is done for two 
reasons:  to make the file harder to infiltrate by attackers and to make the file sealable 
(the seal function has an upper file limit of 150 bytes).  After the file is sealed, the data 
blob is outputted to a file. 
The unseal function, for the most part, looks very similar to the seal function.  The 
same TPM handles are called and a file is passed in to compare with the unsealed data.  
Within the program, the blob is also passed in to be unsealed.  After the unseal, the data, 
which will still be a SHA-1 hash, will be compared to a hash of the file being passed in.  
27
If both files match, the unseal function will return success and the initialize will continue.  
Otherwise it will return a failure and the initialize will stop and BioAPI will not start. 
The last written code was a modification to the BioAPI source code.  The file 
modified was the manage_interface.c file.  In this file, the unseal function mentioned 
earlier was added to the BioAPI initialization function.  The unseal function is called and 
depending on the result, the initialization will continue or the API will completely stop 
loading. 
Finally, the original script used to install BioAPI and the driver was modified to 
copy over the unseal function, the hash function, and a new Makefile in the h_layer 
folder of the BioAPI source code that includes these functions.  This Makefile has been 
modified to include the unseal function and the hash function as sources, creates object 
files from them, and adds them to the library. 
3.2 Results 
 
The objective of the research system is to prevent most, if not all attacks that do 
not exploit the capture device.  By using an attestation device as well as a 
challenge/response system between the authentication service and the biometric 
authentication service, we can assure that most attacks will be prevented.  The result is a 
system that can prevent many more attacks than current systems, while using commodity 
hardware and not requiring proprietary components. 
 Below are screenshots showing how the system works.  When the BioAPI is 
initialized, it calls a TPM Unseal function which checks all the pertinent files to make 
sure they have not been modified.  For testing purposes, we only used the biometric 
driver to seal and unseal.  In Figure 9, a sample biometric program is run and started 
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without problems.  When the biometric driver was modified by only one bit, the same 
sample biometric program did not start at all, as shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 9:  Successful Sample Program Initialization. 
 
Figure 10:  Failed Startup By Slightly Modifying The Driver. 
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Below, in Figure 11 and Figure 12, a BioAPI test is run on the device to make 
sure that the device driver is operating and that it is communicating correctly.  In the first 
example, the test is run successfully.  However, in Figure 12, it can be observed that even 
a simple test will fail if the required files have been changed.  Like stated earlier, this is 
because every time BioAPI is called at all, the TPM function will be called during the 
initialization function and check the known good data against the current data files. 
Figure 11:  Successful BioAPI Device Test. 
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This added protection helps to make sure that there are no modified or corrupted 
files that would compromise the system.  From the previous figures, we have proven that 
any type of change will be picked up before BioAPI even finishes initializing.  By doing 
this so early in the authentication process, the system avoids any type of infiltration by 
the malicious code. 
Figure 12:  Failed Device Test. 
 
However, this extra protection does come at a price.  First, in order to use this 
system, a computer with a trusted platform module already installed would need to be 
used.  While computers outfitted with a TPM are become more and more available, it is 
not yet a standard and therefore must be specified when purchasing.  Cost is not the only 
hurdle.  The time it takes for the TPM to initiate the seal and unseal commands is not 
instantaneous.  In our tests, the unseal function only took a fraction of a second.  But 
what if the administrator wanted to check the integrity of a dozen files, or even more?  
The unseal process might take several seconds.  Ultimately, it is up to the stakeholders to 
decide whether the added protection is worth the several extra seconds it may take to 
authenticate the system.  If the data is more important than an extra small period of time, 
then it should not be an issue. 
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3.3 Threat Assessment
A new attack tree model for the proposed system is shown in Figure 13.  The 
most obvious difference is the separation of machines into approved and rogue.  The 
rogue machine side of the tree is fairly simple.  The only way an outside machine can 
attack the system is through a PKI attack.  This relies only on the strength of the 
cryptography.  If a rogue machine is able to gain access, the cryptography will need to be 
strengthened.  However, with a strong enough cryptography, the rogue machine has very 
little chance of access.  Without a signature from the TPM, the BAS will not be able to 
verify and thus the authentication response will fail.  Therefore, it is difficult for a host 
that is not approved to infiltrate the network. 
Figure 13:  Attack Tree For The Proposed System. 
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An attack using an approved platform is more involved.  While the platform itself 
can be approved, the device itself might become compromised at some point, as well as 
the software that is used for authentication (BioAPI, net client, or the device driver), but 
this would require finding vulnerabilities in these components while still maintaining the 
appearance of system integrity from the view of the preceding component.   
A man in the middle attack (MIM) would have to rely on a cryptographic attack 
or a protocol attack.  As stated earlier, the system will use a 2-way authenticated SSL 
with private keys.  Therefore, it is difficult for a MIM attack to occur with this system. 
In the event of software compromise, the attestation mechanism will prevent 
access in both cases.  In one case, the software might be compromised before boot-up.  In 
this case, the software boot chain will fail as the hash check will fail when the 
compromised software is checked.  In the second case, post-boot compromise, the 
attestation mechanism will check the current state of the software with the hashes held in 
its registers.  If any of the software fails, the attestation mechanism will not sign the live 
sample and the authentication will fail. 
The final case would be the event where nothing has been changed, but instead a 
physical attack on the device is made.  The current system cannot prevent a physical 
attack on the biometric device.  If an attacker was somehow able to physically spoof the 
biometric on an approved machine running approved software, he or she would be able to 
gain access.  Also, if a device was somehow modified, such as the thermal reader on a 
fingerprint reader being modified or removed and replaced, there is nothing to prevent an 
attacker from injecting a signal into the system.  However, methods such as additional 
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authentication factors, liveness testing, multiple attempt lockout, passwords, tokens, 




In the beginning of this paper, we explained the potential weaknesses with using a 
biometric authentication system.  We have proposed a solution that will alleviate 
problems created by a lack of secrets by adding verification to the sample collection 
process.  The research system involves adding an attestation device, a Biometric 
Authentication Server, and biometric independent software.  The system is independent 
of the biometric technology used and does not require single-source or proprietary 
products. 
3.5 Future Work 
Currently, the system only works on a single independent platform.  Since the 
TPM Unseal calls have been added to the source code, adding a BAS would be fairly 
simple as the source code is already written and just needs to be implemented.  Also, the 
SSL sign on needs to be implemented as well.  These additions should not take long to 
add and while important to the system, a remote biometric server and a secure login are 
not new research ideas and could possibly even be pulled from open source code 
elsewhere. 
In terms of where the future of a secure biometric login lies, this requires help 
from the OS developers as well as the biometric manufacturers.  For instance, there is no 
type of real TPM integration within either Windows or Linux.  Also, to a lesser extent, 
the modifications made to BioAPI to include TPM support have not been integrated.  
Even for this research, a software stack was needed in order to manipulate the TPM 
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through Linux.  From a hardware perspective, the next step would be to standardize the 
software and possibly integrate it within the actual device.  By doing this, we can make 
the path even more secure as the sample can be checked for authenticity before it even 
leaves the device.  When we start working towards all these solutions, and when 
developers and manufacturers begin to embrace the TPM in conjunction with a biometric 






 Automake > 1.4 




 Openssl >= 0.9.7 
 Openssl-devel >= 0.9.7 














As stated earlier, the platform used for this system is Fedora Core 5.  If you are 
using a different Linux distro, the installation procedure might be different.  Please visit 
http://fedora.redhat.com for more information on how to download a free version of this 
OS. 
 To install the BioAPI software and driver for a UPEK fingerprint reader (which 
was used in this system), the full installation directions can be found at 
http://www.thinkwiki.org/wiki/How_to_enable_the_fingerprint_reader.  To make things 
easier, if you are running a Fedora Core system, there is a script to completely install 
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everything, including “bioapi_pam”, which adds fingerprint authentication to the Linux 
PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) framework.  For this research, the script has 
been modified to include the TPM functions and the new Makefile described earlier in 
the code overview section.  However, in doing so, the PAM installation will no longer 
work.  This is not a problem though as the PAM framework is not required for the 
purpose of this research.  This script can be downloaded at the site listed below.  Again, 
this can only be used if you are using a Fedora Core distro. 
 When installing the system on a new machine, the TPM code, modified BioAPI 
file, and modified Makefile must be placed in the directory used in the script in order for 
it to work properly.  Alternatively, this code may be placed in another location so long as 
the script is modified to look for the files in said location. 
 The installation of the TPM is a little trickier.  When installing Fedora Core, I did 
not see an option to enable the TPM in Linux.  Therefore, after the system was installed I 
downloaded the kernel.  After extracting, “make menuconfig” must be run.  Within the 
menu, module support for the TPM must be enabled.  After doing so, the modules need to 
be copied by using “make modules_install” and the kernel needs to be compiled. 
 When the new kernel is compiled with TPM support, Trousers can be installed.  
Trousers is used to interact with the TPM and is therefore required.  Before installing 
Trousers, make sure all the dependencies are already installed on the system.  The actual 
installation of Trousers is very straightforward and is included in a README file with 
the source code.  The same goes for tpm-tools, an extension of Trousers, which also 
needs to be installed.  When all these files are correctly installed, the computer is ready 
for TPM use. 
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Software 




Makefile:  http://www.clemson.edu/~tpolon/Makefile 
 
Tspi_Data_Seal:  http://www.clemson.edu/~tpolon/Tspi_Data_Seal.c 
 
Tspi_Data_Unseal:  http://www.clemson.edu/~tpolon/Tspi_Data_Unseal.c 
 
Manage_Interface:  http://www.clemson.edu/~tpolon/manage_interface.c 
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